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Board of Education v. Nyquist: A Keen Eye

Views the Problems in New York's
Educational Financing System
I. Introduction
New York State has long been recognized as a leader in
public education.1 In 1894, New York saw fit to provide a constitutional guarantee of public education.' Recently, however, the
substance of that guarantee has been questioned because of the
disparities in fiscal resources among New York's school districts.3 Like many other states,' New York's system of public
school financing has been challenged on constitutional grounds.
The New York Court of Appeals, in Board of Education v. Nyquist,5 after adopting a rational relation test in analyzing the

1. See L. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 1783-1876, at
148-52 (1980); III C. LINCOLN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 500-04
(1906).
2. See LINCOLN, supra note 1, at 475.
3. The fiscal disparities have triggered equal protection challenges to school financing systems. See generally Levin, Current Trends in School Finance Reform Litigation:
A Commentary, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1099 (traces the evolution of equal protection claims
based on wealth discrimination).
4. See Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973); Serrano v. Priest, 18
Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1977); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of
Educ., Colo. -,
649 P.2d 1005 (1982); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d
359 (1977); McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 285 S.E.2d 156 (1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975); State ex rel. Woodahl v. Straub, 164 Mont.
141, 520 P.2d 776 (1974); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414
U.S. 976 (1973); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976); Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974); Washakie
County School Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
824 (1980); cf. Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972), vacated, 390 Mich.
389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973) (decided prior to San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)).
5. 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982), appeal dismissed, 51
U.S.L.W. 3532 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1983) (Nos. 82-639 and 82-655). This case is commonly
referred to as "Levittown," which was one of the school districts to originally bring this
action.
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equal protection challenges, concluded that the state's system of
financing public education was rationally related to the objective
of maintaining local control over public schools.6 Thus, the court
of appeals held, as Justice Hopkins had found in his appellate
division opinion,7 that New York's reliance on local property
taxes to finance public education does not violate the equal protection clauses of either the federal 8 or state9 constitutions. The
court of appeals also held that the state's system did not violate
the education clause of the New York Constitution. 0
Because of the size of New York's education system, Board
of Education v. Nyquist" bears substantial significance upon
the cases involving equal protection claims against public school
financing schemes. 2 Furthermore, the claim of "metropolitan
overburden" I s advanced by the cities of New York, Buffalo,
Rochester, and Syracuse"' represents the first time that a city,
rather than a mere property-poor school district, has presented
an equal protection claim against a state's public school financing scheme. 5
Section II of this Note discusses New York's system of

6. Id. at 44, 439 N.E.2d at 366, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651, modifying 83 A.D.2d 217, 443
N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d Dep't 1981).
7. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 258, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 869 (Hopkins, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in relevant part: "[Nlor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
9. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11 provides in relevant part: "No person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof."
10. N.Y. CONsT. art. XI, § 1 provides: "The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this
state may be educated."
11. 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982), appeal dismissed, 51
U.S.L.W. 3532 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1983) (Nos. 82-639 and 82-655).
12. See supra note 4.
13. Metropolitan overburden is a combination of municipal and educational overburden. See infra text accompanying notes 43-46.
14. These cities comprise the group known as the plaintiffs-intervenors. See infra
text accompanying note 39.
15. See Thomas, Equalizing EducationalOpportunity Through School Finance Reform: A Review Assessment, 48 U. CIN. L. Rav. 255, 294 (1979). Cities normally have
substantial property wealth from which to finance education. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist,
94 Misc. 2d 466, 494, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 619-20 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1978). Thus, it
can be inferred that they have not been disadvantaged by virtue of the state's reliance on
local property taxes.
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school financing as it relates to Board of Education v. Nyquist. 6
Section III discusses the constitutionality of school finance systems with particular emphasis on the United States Supreme
Court decision in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez.1 7 Section IV outlines the decisions of the New York
courts. Section V reasons that the court of appeals correctly
adopted the dissenting portion of Justice Hopkins' appellate division opinion. This Note concludes that the rational relation
test is the appropriate test for considering equal protection challenges to public school financing schemes.

II. Facts
A.

New York's School FinancingSystem' s

The financial support of New York's more than 700 school
districts '9 is obtained primarily from ad valorem20 taxes on real
property within each district.2 1 The distribution of real property
wealth is unequal among districts, and results in disparate available revenues for the districts. 2 Under this system, the amount
of revenues raised locally depends on each district's self-imposed
tax rate, 3 but is also a function of the assessed value of real
16. 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1978), modified, 83
A.D.2d 217, 443 N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d Dep't 1981), modified, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359,
453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982), appeal dismissed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3532 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1983) (Nos.
82-639 and 82-655).
17. 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (5-4 decision).
18. For the purposes of this Note, unless otherwise indicated, all facts are drawn
from the appellate division opinion. Statutory amendments to the state aid formula were
enacted subsequent to the trial court decision and were considered by the appellate division, pursuant to the appellate division's obligation to decide the appeal based on the
law at the time the case is presented to the appellate division. Fruhling v. Amalgamated
Hous. Corp., 9 N.Y.2d 541, 545-46, 175 N.E.2d 156, 157, 215 N.Y.S.2d 493, 495, appeal
dismissed, 368 U.S. 70 (1961); accord United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
103, 110 (1801).
19. These school districts include over 4000 schools, wherein 200,000 professionals
educate approximately 3,000,000 children. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 219,
443 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
20. Ad valorem taxation is "[a]ccording to value" of the property taxed. BLACK'S
LAw DICTiONARY 48 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
21. Local school districts supply 55% of total educational funds in New York. The
state contributes 40% and the balance is obtained from federal sources. Board of Educ.
v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 224, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
22. See id. at 226-27, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 849-50.
23. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 2021(8)-(21) (McKinney 1969) (empowering districts
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property within the district."' Consequently, poor school districts are unable to generate the revenue obtained by affluent
school districts.25
State aid" is intended to equalize the disparities and insure
a minimum level of support for each district.27 Under the current formula for computing the district allotment, each district
is guaranteed a minimum support level of $1,650 per pupil.28 To
be eligible under the state system, each district is required to
impose an 11.57 mill tax on its full tax base. 2 The state aid then
compensates any district that is unable to generate $1,650 per
pupil by its own efforts.3 0 In addition, every district is entitled to
a flat grant of $360 per pupil, regardless of wealth.3 1
The state aid formula also permits districts to compute
their allotments under "total save harmless" or "special aid"
provisions.3 2 These provisions allow districts with diminishing
pupil counts or increased property wealth to avoid decreases in
to vote a tax for school financing).
24. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d at 486, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
25. See id. at 488, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 616 (quoting 1 GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON AID
TO EDUCATION (1975)).
26. See generally N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 3601-3609 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1982)
(providing for the apportionment of money to the school districts).
27. See Dugan, The Constitutionalityof School Finance Systems Under State Law:
New York's Turn, 27 SYRACUSE L. REv. 573, 590 (1976).
28. In a footnote, the appellate division stated:
The current formula for computing first tier operating aid is:
OA,

=

$1,650 (1 - .51

district valuation/total wealth pupil units)
$72,700

Thus, for the district of average wealth as of 1981 (that is, one in which district
valuation/total wealth pupil units equals $72,700) State aid under the first tier is
$1,650 (1-[.51 x 1]) = $808.50. ...
The current formula for computing second tier operating aid is:
$235 (1 - .80 district adjusted gross income)
$29,700
Thus, the district which has an adjusted gross income equal to the State average
as of 1981 (i.e., $29,700) received $47 per pupil unit ($235 [1-.80 x 11 = $47 ... ).
Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 225 n.10, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 848 n.10 (citations
omitted). The second tier was considered to be insignificant because of the limited sums
involved at that tier. Id. at 225, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
29. Id. at 224-25, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
30. Id. at 225, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
31. Id. at 225, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
32. Id. at 225-26, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
OA,

=
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their allotments by allowing them to receive the same total state
aid as in the previous year.33 Thus, a district may maintain a
level of state assistance "without accounting for [its] currently
34
lessened needs.
The disparities resulting from the current system are illustrated by the statistics admitted at trial. "[T]he range in real
property wealth among school districts extended from $8,884 in
the poorest district to $412,370 behind each pupil in the wealthiest district. . . ."3 Similarly, individual district spending varied
greatly, ranging from $936 in the poorest district to $4,215 in the
wealthiest.3 6
B.

Plaintiffs' Allegations

The "original plaintiffs," consisting of the boards of education of twenty-seven school districts located throughout the
37
state and twelve school children from some of those districts,
instituted this suit in 1974.- The "plaintiffs-intervenors," consisting of the boards of education of New York City, Rochester,
Buffalo, and Syracuse, the United Parents Associations of New
York, Inc., and twelve school children from the city school districts, subsequently intervened and served a separate complaint.8 9 The defendants were the University of the State of New
York, the Comptroller of the State of New York, and the Commissioners of Education and Taxation and Finance of the State
of New York 4 0
The original plaintiffs alleged that, by virtue of their districts having less valuable real property, they could not match
the ability of more affluent districts to generate tax revenue,
thus precluding equal educational advantages across the state.4 1
Furthermore, the state system was structurally unable to eliminate the gross disparities that arise from the uneven distribution

33. Id. at 226, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 849.

34. Id.
35. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist,
36. Id. at 489, 408 N.Y.S.2d at
37. Id. at 475, 408 N.Y.S.2d at
38. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist,
39. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist,
40. Id. at 476, 408 N.Y.S.2d at
41. Id. at 477, 408 N.Y.S.2d at

94 Misc. 2d at 486, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 615.
616.
608-09.
83 A.D.2d at 221, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
94 Misc. 2d at 475-76, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 608-09.
609.
609.
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of real property values among the school districts.2 Thus, the
unequal financial resources available to the plaintiff districts
compelled plaintiffs to offer an inferior education because they
were unable to provide "educational advantages such as: small
class size; experienced and effective teachers; low pupil-teacher
ratios; curricular breadth; extensive extracurricular programs;
modern equipment; and special programs for the disadvantaged
or the specially gifted. '43 Therefore, the original plaintiffs contended that the state's public school financing system consti44
tuted a violation of the equal protection clauses of the federal
and state4 5 constitutions.
An additional ground was asserted by the original plaintiffs,
directed solely at New York's educational scheme. By allowing
the gross disparities to exist, the state system was claimed to be
in violation of the New York constitutional mandate requiring a
"system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this
' 46
state may be educated."
The plaintiffs-intervenors asserted similar claims based,
however, on the theories of "municipal overburden" and "educational overburden.' 7 Under the theory of municipal overburden,
it was claimed that while urban school districts have adequate
real property wealth, the tax revenues must finance a "variety of
municipal services of which education is but one.' 48 Consequently, the noneducational services, such as police,' 9 fire,5 0 welfare,5 1 and transportation, 52 reduce the amount of funds availa-

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 479, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 610.

45. Id. at 476, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
46. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; see Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d at 478, 408
N.Y.S.2d at 610.
47. See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d at 479-80, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 611.
48. Id. at 494, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
49. The trial court noted that higher levels of population density, poverty, and unemployment exist in urban rather than in suburban areas. These factors contributed to
higher crime rates which necessitated "police expenditures that ran from two to six times
greater than was the case in ... suburban areas." Id. at 498, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 622.

50. The population and building densities of cities were found to contribute to the
higher costs of urban fire protection. Id.
51. The trial court stated that "[tihe evidence showed that although only 43% of
the State's population resides in New York City, 70% of the State-wide recipients of
public assistance were living in that city." Id. at 499, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
52. The evidence admitted at trial showed that "transit operating expenses were

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/13
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ble to finance education." The theory of educational overburden
was founded on three factors. First, it was claimed that the
plaintiffs-intervenors' education dollar had less purchasing
power compared with rural districts' educational dollar.6 ' Thus,
the higher costs faced by city school districts required them to
pay more than rural school districts to avail themselves of comparable benefits." Second, the use of average daily attendance
to determine the number of students within a district overstated
the fiscal capacity of the city school districts because of the high
rate of absenteeism within the city districts." Finally, it was
contended that the city school districts contain high concentrations of pupils with special educational needs."' As a result of
the state's failure to account for the factors constituting municipal and educational overburden, the plaintiffs-intervenors
claimed that the financing system violated the state and federal
equal protection clauses, as well as the education clause of the
New York Constitution."

$33.39 per capita in [New York City] as compared to a level of only $6.64 in the rest of
the State." Id. at 508, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 623. Other noneducational services cited by the
court were health care, corrections systems, court systems, parks and recreational facilities, and public housing. Id. at 499-500, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 622-23.
53. Id. at 496, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
54. Id. at 501, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
55. Id. at 502, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 624. For example, in 1974-75, the average teacher
salary in upstate New York was $12,737 whereas in New York City the average was
$16,498. Id.
56. Id. at 495, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 620. The five largest cities in New York had an average attendance rate of 84% compared with a rate of 93.83% in the balance of the state.
Id. at 503, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 625. The appellate division noted:
With planning based on total enrollment and the concomitant need to render additional assistance to pupils who have fallen behind due to absence, the high number of absentees increases education costs in the cities while at the same time
depriving them of needed succor. Because the high absentee rate is a direct consequence of poverty and underlying social conditions, its effects are inexorable and
its financial effects cannot be alleviated by employment of additional attendance
officers.
Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 231, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
57. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d at 495, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 620. The special
educational needs of the children in the city school districts are caused by, inter alia,
physical and economic disadvantages, impaired learning abilities, and illiteracy in English. See id. at 505-11, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 626-33.
58. Id. at 479, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 611.
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Background

The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of
the United States Constitution 9 guarantees that individuals will
be treated by the state in a similar manner. 0e The clause is implicated when state law classifies individuals;" the concept of
classification inherently implies unequal treatment of individuals. Despite this inevitable unequal treatment, courts will only
invalidate those classifications that are based upon impermissible criteria or used to burden a specific group of individuals. 2
In determining the validity of a classification, the judiciary
has established varying standards of review. The standards of
review for the equal protection clause has traditionally been considered "two-tiered." '8 The first tier is the rational relation test,
which merely requires that the classification bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. 4 The second tier, known
as strict scrutiny, removes the presumption of validity that attaches to the state classification and requires the state to show:
(1) a compelling state interest, (2) the classification is necessary
to promote that interest, and (3) no less drastic alternative
5
exists.
Under this two-tiered approach, the threshold determination is what level of review is to be applied. The general rule for
this determination is that unless a fundamental right" is in-

59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See supra note 8 for the relevant text of the
fourteenth amendment.
60. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 517
(1978) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
61. See id. at 518.
62. See id. at 519; Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CALIF. L. REv. 341, 343 (1949); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-1
(1978); Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
63. See Fox, Equal ProtectionAnalysis: Laurence Tribe, The Middle Tier, and the
Role of the Court, 14 U.S.F.L. REv. 525, 525 (1980); see also Gunther, The Supreme
Court 1971 Term - Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
64. E.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973); see
also NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 60, at 524.
65. E.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973); see
also NOWAK,CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 60, at 524.
66. Fundamental rights include the right to vote, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330 (1972); right to travel, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); right to procreate, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), and the specific guarantees enu-
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fringed or a suspect class67 is burdened, then the rational relation test is appropriate. 8 The two-tiered approach, however, has
come under severe criticism because of the lack of an intermediate level of review, and the outcome determinative characteristics of both tiers.6 9 Consequently, courts have slowly departed
from the rigid two-tiered approach, adopting an intermediate
level of review. 70 This intermediate level, known as heightened
scrutiny or the "sliding scale" test, requires that the classification bear a substantial
relationship to an important governmen1
tal interest.7

A. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
The landmark case on equal protection challenges to school
financing systems is San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez, 2 where the United States Supreme Court held
that the Texas system did not violate the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.73 Rodriguez involved a
class action suit on behalf of children of poor families residing in
districts having a low property tax base.7 4 The Texas school
financing system,75 which was substantially similar to other state
merated in the Bill of Rights, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (freedom of
religion).
67. State classifications are considered suspect if they are based upon race, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); alienage, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); or
national origin, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
68. See NOWAK, CONSTrrTUTIoNAL LAW, supra note 60, at 524.
69. See, e.g., Fox, Equal Protection Analysis: Laurence Tribe, The Middle Tier,
and the Role of the Court, 14 U.S.F.L. REv. 525, 526 (1980); see also L. TamE, AmuFucAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-30 (1978); Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer
Equal Protection,86 HARv. L. Rav. 1 (1972).
70. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (gender).
71. Id.; see NOWAK, CONSTrrtUTONAL LAW, supra note 60, at 525.
72. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
73. Id. at 6.
74. Id. at 5.
75. The financing of public schools in Texas was centered around a Minimum Foundation Program, which was designed to supplement the funds raised by an ad valorem
property tax imposed by local school districts. The Program provided funds to cover the
costs of teacher salaries, school maintenance and transportation. The general revenues of
the state provided 80% of the funds with the remaining 20% provided by local school
districts. Each local school district received a share of the funds raised by the Program
according to an economic index which unintentionally rewarded the payment of high
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systems in its reliance on local property taxes,76 was challenged
for its failure to relieve the interdistrict disparities in per pupil
expenditures. 77 The plaintiffs argued that strict scrutiny was
mandated not only because education was a fundamental right,
but also because the system discriminated on the basis of
wealth, the poor being a suspect class.s
The threshold issue in Rodriguez was the choice of the standard of review for the equal protection analysis. Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, refused to find that education was a
fundamental right, and thus strict scrutiny was not invoked on
that basis.7 9 The majority did, however, recognize the "vital role
of education in a free society."8 0 But, since the right to education was not explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the United
States Constitution, s1 Justice Powell refused to equate education
to a substantive constitutional right."a
In attempting to characterize the plaintiffs' class, the Court
considered three possibilities:
(1). . . 'poor' persons whose incomes fall below some identifiable
level of poverty or who might be characterized as functionally 'indigent,' or (2)... those who are relatively poorer than others, or
(3)... all those who, irrespective of their personal incomes, hapteacher
76.
77.
78.

salaries paid by affuent districts. Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 47-48.
Id. at 15.
Brief for Appellees at 3, San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

1 (1973), reprinted in 76 LANDMARK BRips AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 173, 175 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 1975).

79. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1973).
80. Id. at 30.

81. Id. at 33-37.
82. Id. at 37. Justice Marshall's dissent, however, argued that education was a
fundamental right because of the close relationship between education and other constitutionally protected rights, such as freedom of speech and the right to vote. Id. at 112-14
(Marshall, J., dissenting). According to Justice Marshall, this relationship existed because education affects an individual's ability to enjoy his protected rights and furthermore, "[elducation may instill the interest and provide the tools necessary for political
discourse and debate." Id. at 113.
In response to Justice Marshall's dissent, Justice Powell argued that it would be
impossible to determine what quantum of education is required for the enjoyment of
these constitutionally protected rights. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1973). Furthermore, Justice Powell recognized that these constitutionally protected rights could only be affected by an absolute denial of educational opportunity and thus, the Texas system could not be challenged for failing to provide basic
minimal educational skills. Id. at 36-37.
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pen to reside in relatively poorer school districts."3
The Court, however, found that each of these categories was incongruous with classes traditionally defined as being discriminated against.84 The Court noted that such classes "shared two
distinguishing characteristics: because of their impecunity they
were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a
consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit.""' According to the majority, since the alleged classes did not contain either of these
characteristics," the plaintiffs' class was not subject to discrimination in traditional terms.8 7 Furthermore, the Court noted that
had the class been discriminated against, it would still not qualify as a suspect class because it lacked the traditional indicia of
suspectness.88 Absent traditional criteria of discrimination and
the requisite indicia of suspectness in the plaintiffs' class, the
Court was precluded from applying strict scrutiny on the basis
of a suspect class.8 9
The majority further reasoned that strict scrutiny was inappropriate because of the principles of federalism.9 0 Since the
case involved the local concerns of fiscal and educational policy,
the "Court's lack of specialized knowledge and experience"
counseled "against premature interference with the informed
judgments made at the state and local levels." 91
After refusing to apply strict scrutiny, the Court analyzed
the Texas school financing system under the rational relation

83. Id. at 19-20 (footnote omitted). Justice Marshall suggested, however, that "the

schoolchildren of property poor districts constitute a sufficient class." Id. at 91 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
84. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1973).
85. Id.
86. The majority reasoned that the plaintiffs' class was not discriminated against
because there was no definable category of "poor" people and no absolute deprivation of
education. Id. at 25.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 28. The traditional indicia of suspectness require that the class be "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." Id.
89. Id. at 27, 28.
90. Id. at 44.
91. Id. at 42.
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test.92 With the preservation of local control identified as a legitimate state interest, 9s the Texas school financing system was
held to be rationally related to that interest. 4 The impact of
Rodriguez was to preclude the use of strict scrutiny for federal
equal protection challenges to school financing systems.9 5 In
light of the rubber stamp qualities of the rational relation test,9 6
the likelihood of success for future equal protection challenges
to state school financing schemes was bleak.
B.

State Decisions Post-Rodriguez

Encouragement for future school finance reform through the
courts came only thirteen days after Rodriguez. In Robinson v.
Cahill,9 7 the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated the New
Jersey system of financing public schools.9 8 The Robinson court
did not relyon equal protection analysis to strike down the state
system. 9 ' The New Jersey public school financing system was
found to have violated the education clause of the New Jersey
Constitution. 10 0
92. In 1973, the Supreme Court was still adhering to a two-tiered approach to equal
protection analysis. But see id. at 98-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (advocating the application of a "spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the
Equal Protection Clause").
93. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49 (1973). In recognizing the legitimacy of local control, the Rodriguez Court relied on Wright v. Council of
the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 469 (1972) ("[d]irect control over decisions vitally
affecting the education of one's children is a need that is strongly felt in our society").
94. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973). The Court
recognized, however, that had strict scrutiny been applied, the Texas school financing
system would have clearly violated the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 17.
95. See Thomas, EqualizingEducational Opportunity Through School Finance Reform: A Review Assessment, 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 255, 288 (1979).
96. See supra text accompanying note 69.
97. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
98. Id. at 520, 303 A.2d at 298.
99. See id. at 492, 303 A.2d at 283. Rodriguez, however, was interpreted as not precluding the court from finding a potential state equal protection violation. Id. at 490-91,
303 A.2d at 282.
100. Id. at 519, 303 A.2d at 297; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, 1 provides: "The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system
of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State between the ages
of five and eighteen years." The Robinson court interpreted this clause as requiring "that
educational opportunity which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for
his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor market." Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J.
at 515, 303 A.2d at 295.
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In a similar challenge, the California Supreme Court invalidated its state's school financing system by divorcing the state's
0 1 from their federal counterpart.10 2
equal protection provisions
0
In Serrano v. Priest,"'
the court applied the strict scrutiny test
under the California Constitution and noted the "independent
vitality [of the state equal protection provisions] which, in a
given case, may demand an analysis different from that which
14
would obtain if only the federal standard were applicable."'
Moreover, the concerns of federalism, which guided the Supreme
Court in Rodriguez,0 5 were not applicable to the California Supreme Court. 00 Thus, the California Supreme Court applied
strict scrutiny because "(1) discrimination in educational opportunity on the basis of district wealth involves a suspect
classifi07
cation, and (2) education is a fundamental interest."
C.

New York's Approach

In New York, the right to a free public education is guaranteed by the state constitution. 08 The right to education, however, is not absolute. '° Although the state must provide "for the
maintenance and support of a system of free common schools,
wherein all the children of this state may be educated,"" 0 the
state is not compelled to enact a comprehensive program that
fully provides for each pupil's individual needs."' For example,
101. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 11 provides: "All laws of a general nature shall have a
uniform operation." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 21 provides: "No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the Legislature; nor shall any citizen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which,
upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens." These provisions have been
construed to constitute California's equal protection provisions, which are substantially
equivalent to their federal counterpart. See, e.g., Department of Mental Hygiene v.
Kirchner, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 588, 400 P.2d 321, 322, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 330 (1965).
102. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 765-66, 557 P.2d 929, 951, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345,
367 (1977). See supra note 8 for the text of the federal equal protection clause.
103. 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1977).
104. Id. at 764, 557 P.2d at 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
105. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
106. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d at 766-67, 557 P.2d at 952, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
107. Id. at 765-66, 557 P.2d at 951, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
108. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1. See supra note 10 for the text of the provision.
109. See IV C. LINCOLN, THE CONSITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 707 (1906).
110. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
111. See In re Levy, 38 N.Y.2d 653, 345 N.E.2d 556, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 805 (1976). In Levy, the court of appeals stated:
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the New York Court of Appeals, in In re Levy,"' acknowledged
that it was not a violation of the equal protection clause for the
state to provide free education to children who were deaf or
blind, yet require parents of children with other handicaps, such
as mental retardation, to bear the maintenance portion of the
special educational services required for such children."' In
Levy, the court of appeals concluded that education was not "a
'fundamental constitutional right' as to be entitled to special
constitutional protection . . . . Accordingly, the appropriate
standard is not the so-called strict scrutiny test or anything ap1 14
proaching it, but rather the traditional rational basis test."
IV. Board of Education v. Nyquist
A.

The Trial Court

After dismissing the original plaintiffs' claim on federal
equal protection grounds because of the stare decisis effect of
Rodriguez,"' Justice Smith" 6 addressed the question of what
standard of review is required under the equal protection clause
of New York's Constitution."'
It would be unthinkable ... to suggest that confronted with economic strictures
State government is powerless to move forward in the fields of education and social welfare with anything less than totally comprehensive programs. Such a contention would suggest that the only alternative open to the Legislature in the exercise of its policy-making responsibility, if it were to conclude that wholly free
education could not be provided for all handicapped children, would be to withdraw the benefits now conferred on blind and deaf children - thus to fall back to
an undifferentiated and senseless but categorically neat policy that since all could
not be benefitted, none would be.
Id. at 660, 345 N.E.2d at 560, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
112. 38 N.Y.2d 653, 345 N.E.2d 556, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S.
805 (1976) (construing N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 234 (McKinney 1975) (amended 1976)).
113. In re Levy, 38 N.Y.2d at 661, 345 N.E.2d at 560, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
114. Id. at 658, 345 N.E.2d at 558, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 15 (citing as controlling San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)). The Levy court also refused to find that handicapped children constituted a suspect class. In re Levy, 38
N.Y.2d at 658, 345 N.E.2d at 558, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
115. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d at 519, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 634. For a
discussion of Rodriguez, see supra text accompanying notes 72-94.
116. Justice L. Kingsley Smith delivered the opinion for the New York Supreme
Court in Nassau County. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1978).
117. Id. at 519-20, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 634-35. See supra note 9, for the relevant text of
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
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Justice Smith began his analysis by attempting to identify
either a suspect class or fundamental interest which would justify the use of strict scrutiny. Regarding the suspect class issue,
Justice Smith stated that "the division of the State into school
districts possessing varying amounts of property wealth"'1' is insufficient to justify the existence of a suspect class according to
wealth. 1 9 Since there was no discriminatory purpose, it was legitimate for the legislature to create school districts to aid in the
20
discharge of its education obligation.1
In considering whether education qualified as a fundamental interest, the trial court determined that Rodriguez was not
controlling because of the explicit guarantee of education in the
2
New York Constitution, not found in the federal constitution.' '
Justice Smith did, however, conclude that In re Levy'12 precluded the use of strict scrutiny based on the right to
23
education.
The trial court nonetheless reasoned that the unavailability
of strict scrutiny did not compel the use of the lenient rational
relation test. Justice Smith selected the intermediate level of review, called the "sliding scale" test,'2 4 which had been recognized by the New York Court of Appeals in Alevy v. Downstate
Medical Center.'25 The sliding scale test requires that the challenged discrimination satisfy a substantial state interest, and

118. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d at 520, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 521, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 635. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
122. 38 N.Y.2d 653, 345 N.E.2d 556, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S.
805 (1976). For a discussion of Levy, see supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
123. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d at 522, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
124. Id. at 522-23, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
125. 39 N.Y.2d 326, 334, 348 N.E.2d 537, 544, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82, 89 (1976). Alevy
involved a reverse discrimination claim wherein the petitioner was denied admission to
medical school even though minority students with inferior credentials were accepted.
The Alevy court rejected the use of strict scrutiny for reverse discrimination, stating that
it "would cut against the very grain of the [fourteenth] amendment, were the equal protection clause used to strike down measures designed to achieve real equality for persons
whom it was intended to aid." Id. at 335, 348 N.E.2d at 545, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 89. Similarly, the Alevy court rejected the use of the rational relation test because "preferential
treatment programs involve perpetuating undesirable perceptions of race as criteria affecting State action . . . and, therefore, should be subjected to more careful scrutiny
than traditional standards of rationality ordinarily invoked." Id. at 335-36, 348 N.E.2d at
545, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 90 (citation omitted).

15

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:621

that it be the least objectionable alternative. 26 Applying the
sliding scale test, Justice Smith identified the state interest as
the "obligation to 'provide for the maintenance and support of a
system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this
state may be educated.' "1127 In interpreting the education clause
as requiring equal educational opportunity,12 8 the court noted
that the uncontroverted evidence showed the unequal distribution of property wealth and the corresponding variation in operating expenditures among the state's school districts.1 2 9 Evaluation of this evidence led to the trial court's conclusion that the
system of relying primarily on local property taxes to finance
public education operated in a discriminatory manner.130 This
discrimination, coupled with the existence of less objectionable
alternatives,' 1 resulted in the trial court's holding that New
York's school financing system violated the state equal protection clause as to the original plaintiffs, measured under the slid2
13
ing scale test.

The trial court also found a violation of the education clause
as to the original plaintiffs because of the state's failure to correct the disparities arising from the use of local real property
taxes. - Justice Smith reasoned that the constitutional violation
arose from the operation of the school financing scheme and not
126. See id. at 336-37, 348 N.E.2d at 545-46, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 90. In order to satisfy
the substantial interest requirement, it must be shown that the "gain to be derived from
the preferential policy outweighs its possible detrimental effects." Id. at 336, 348 N.E.2d
at 545, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 90 (footnote omitted). Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
521 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (the equal protection analysis should focus on the
character of the classification, the value of the government benefits denied the class, and
the asserted interest in support of the classification).
127. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d at 523, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 636 (quoting
N.Y. CONsT. art. XI, § 1). See supra note 10 for the text of New York's education clause.
128. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d at 523, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 636. The trial
court recognized that the purpose of state aid should be to remedy the inter-district
disparities that would exist absent such aid. Id.
129. Id. at 523, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
130. Id. at 524, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
131. The trial court did not describe any specific alternatives, but merely indicated
their existence. Id. at 524-25, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 637-38. See generally Grubb, The First
Round of Legislative Reforms in the Post-Serrano World, 38 LAw & CoNraMP. PROS.
459 (1974) (discussion of alternative school finance systems).
132. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d at 525, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
133. Id. at 528, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
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its basic structure.3 4
In addressing the plaintiffs-intervenors' equal protection
claims, Justice Smith concluded that the state school financing
system created classifications between urban and nonurban
school districts by failing to account for the "overburdening conditions that affect the large cities and the schools located within
their boundaries." 3 5 Accordingly, "[s]uch a classification bears
no reasonable relation to the statute's purpose of providing
State aid to districts in proportion to their need.' ' 3 6 Thus, since
the classification could not withstand scrutiny under the rational
relation test, New York's financing scheme was found to constitute a denial of state equal protection as to the plaintiffs7
intervenors.1
Regarding the plaintiffs-intervenors' federal equal protection claim, Justice Smith interpreted Rodriguez as merely
prohibiting the use of strict scrutiny during a court's evaluation
of such claims.' 8 Justice Smith stated that "Rodriguez does not
mean that an educational statute's compliance with the federal
equal protection standards cannot be tested by a less rigorous
standard of review."' 3 9 Thus, by applying the rational relation
test to the plaintiffs-intervenors' federal equal protection claim,
Justice Smith concluded that a violation existed for the same
reasons that justified his conclusion regarding the state equal
40
protection issue.1

134. Id. at 528-29, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 640. Justice Smith stressed that the state's use of
local school districts and locally imposed real property taxes was constitutionally permissible. Id.
135. Id. at 529, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 641. For a discussion of the overburdening conditions affecting the plaintiffs-intervenors, see supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
136. Id. at 530, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 641. The statutes providing state aid to New York's
public schools appear at N.Y. EDuc. LAW §§ 3601-3609 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1982).
137. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d at 530, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 641. It was
unnecessary for the trial court to subject the classification to more careful scrutiny because it could not survive the most lenient standard of review.
138. Id. at 532, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
139. Id. at 531, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 642. The trial court noted that In re Levy, 38
N.Y.2d 653, 345 N.E.2d 556, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 805 (1976), was
an instance where the court of appeals applied a less rigorous standard of scrutiny in the
equal protection analysis of an education statute. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d
at 531, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 642. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of In re Levy.
140. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d at 532, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 642. See supra
notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
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In addressing the education clause issue, Justice Smith
stated that "the education article must be regarded as

. .

.guar-

anteeing to all the children of the State an equal opportunity to
acquire basic minimal educational skills." 1 " Consequently, the
existence of a substantial number of pupils in the large urban
school districts who failed to acquire basic minimal educational
skills coupled with the state's failure to remedy this condition
resulted in Justice Smith's finding a violation of the education
clause as to the plaintiffs-intervenors." 2
After finding the respective constitutional violations, the
trial court retained jurisdiction until the legislature had the opportunity to remedy the public school financing scheme.14 3
B.

The Appellate Division
1. Majority opinion

After reiterating the trial court's findings of fact regarding
the gross disparities in fiscal capacity among the school districts,
Justice Lazer, writing for the majority, l4 4 addressed the question
of what standard of review is applicable in determining the
equal protection claims. Justice Lazer reasoned that Rodriguez,
Alevy, and Levy were controlling, thus precluding application of
the strict scrutiny standard."5 The appellate division acknowledged the existence of the intermediate standard of review (sliding scale), thereby refusing
to limit its analysis to the traditional
6
two-tiered approach."

141. Id. at 533, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 643. The trial court considered New Jersey's education clause to be substantially similar to New York's. Thus, the interpretation given New
Jersey's education clause in Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied,
414 U.S. -976 (1973), was cited approvingly by Justice Smith. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist,
94 Misc. 2d at 532-33, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 642-43. For a discussion of Robinson, see supra
notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
142. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d at 534, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
143. Id. at 537, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 645.
144. Justice Lazer delivered the majority opinion, and was joined by Justice Gibbons. Justice Weinstein filed a separate concurring opinion. Justice Hopkins delivered a
separate opinion wherein he concurred in part and dissented in part. Board of Educ. v.
Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d 217, 443 N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d Dep't 1981).
145. Id. at 239, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
146. Id. at 238-39, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 857. See supra notes 60-71 and accompanying
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Because of the important function of education, 4 7 Justice
Lazer applied the intermediate, or heightened scrutiny, level of
review for the equal protection analysis. In applying this sliding
scale test, the appellate division identified preservation of local
control as the state interest,'4 8 whereas the lower court had identified equality of educational opportunity as the state interest. 41 9
After balancing the fiscal disparities in the education system against the state's justification of local control, the appellate
division majority concluded that the statutory scheme could not
survive heightened scrutiny.' 50 Therefore, the financing scheme
was held to violate the state equal protection clause as to both
the original plaintiffs and the plaintiffs-intervenors.1 5'
In considering the federal equal protection claims, the appellate division noted that the United States Supreme Court in
Rodriguez had failed to delineate that minimum quantum of education which must be transgressed prior to finding a fourteenth
amendment violation. 5 Because of the lack of specific guidelines, the appellate division reasoned that there was not foundation from which the court could find a federal equal protection
violation as to either the original plaintiffs or the plaintiffsintervenors. 5
In upholding the finding of an education clause violation,
the majority considered the purpose of the education clause as
mandating "the maintenance of a system of schools in which all

147. Id. at 240, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 857-58. Accord Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 493 (1954) (a state's most important function is education).
148. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 242, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 859. Accord San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49 (1973) (recognizing the importance of local control over education).
149. See supra notes 127-28. In identifying the state interest, Justice Laer noted
that courts are limited to consideration of those interests proffered by the state, and
should not articulate conjectural interests to defend a classification. Board of Educ. v.
Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 242, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 859. Accord Alevy v. Downstate Medical
Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 336, 348 N.E.2d 537, 545, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82, 90 (1976).
150. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 242, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 859. Justice Lazer
stated that "[flor the property poor, local control of education is more illusory than real,
for it cannot be utilized to produce the educational output local authorities preceive [sic]
as appropriate, but only what a limited tax base will permit." Id. at 243, 443 N.Y.S.2d at
859.
151. Id. at 245, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
152. Id. at 245, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 860. See supra note 82.
153. Id. at 245, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
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the children of the State could be equipped with certain basic
educational skills necessary to function effectively in society."''
Thus, since the evidence demonstrated that many children
emerge from the school system lacking these skills,15 5 the appellate division concluded that the education clause was violated.'
2.

Justice Hopkins' opinion

While Justice Hopkins agreed that Rodriguez controlled the
federal equal protection issue and was not binding authority on
the state equal protection issue, he noted that the reasoning of
the United States Supreme Court should be given substantial
deference in guiding the interpretation of New York's equal protection clause. 57 Thus, using the analysis approved by the Supreme Court in Rodriguez,'5 8 Justice Hopkins concluded that

proof of an absolute deprivation of educational opportunity was
needed in order to succeed on an equal protection claim. 59 According to Justice Hopkins,
What the plaintiffs' proof suggests circumstantially is that the
complaining school districts employ a lower ratio of teaching staff
to students, that their teaching staff may not possess as extensive
experience or training, that they do not have as many guidance
counselors, psychologists and ancillary staff, and that their curricula are more limited
in subject matter than those that exist in
60
wealthier districts.'

154. Id. at 248, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
155. The court relied on:
[T]he findings that thousands of children fail to acquire even minimal skills in
reading, vocabulary and mathematics in lower grades and later underachieve or
fail because they lack those skills; that thousands who pass through the school
system can only decode words without comprehending them, cannot use graphs,
maps or indexes, and cannot apply acquired knowledge . . . to solve problems;
that thousands who attend high school read at a fifth grade level or below and
some of these read at a third or even second grade level; and that some students
leave the system wholly illiterate.
Id. at 250, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
156. Id. at 251, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
157. Id. at 259, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 869 (Hopkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
158. See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
159. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 259, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 869 (Hopkins, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
160. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 259, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 869-70 (Hopkins,
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These circumstantial findings were deemed insufficient by Justice Hopkins to show an absolute deprivation of educational opportunity, and thus the plaintiffs' claims should fail regardless of
the level of review used. 6"
Additionally, Justice Hopkins was concerned with the impact this case would have on other New York constitutional
mandates if the equal protection claim prevailed. The constitutional mandates of support for the needy, 6 2 public health, 16 the
care of persons suffering from natural disorders, 6 and public
housing'65 were noted as requiring treatment similar to education.1 66 Consequently, "the argument of the plaintiffs underpinning their claim of constitutional discrimination on the ground
of disparity of wealth prove[d] too much' and would, if accepted,
effectively destroy the long-established governmental principle
that the municipality can be expected to deal competently with
6 7
State functions delegated to it.'
Although Justice Hopkins relegated the equal protection
claims to mere disparities inherent in the use of any geographical unit,' " the determination of the appropriate standard of review was still considered. " ' While agreeing that strict scrutiny

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161. Id. at 263, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 871 (Hopkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). In illustrating that these circumstantial findings did not necessarily imply an
inferior education by the poorer school districts, Justice Hopkins stated:
(1) the one-room school house in a school district may or may not provide as good
instruction as another school district containing many school houses having a
grade to a room, depending on the skills and dedication of the teacher and the
interest of the students; (2) the access to the great museums within the City of
New York enjoyed by the students in its schools may or may not be an advantage
over school districts so distant from the city that their students are foreclosed
from using such facilities, depending again, on the bent of the teachers and the
curiosity of the students.
Id. at 260 n.2, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 870 n.2.
162. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
163. Id. § 3.
164. Id. §4.
165. Id. art. XVIII, § 1.
166. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 261, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 871 (Hopkins, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
167. Id. (Hopkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
168. Id. at 260, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 870 (Hopkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
169. Id. at 263, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 871 (Hopkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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was inappropriate,1 70 Justice Hopkins suggested that heightened
scrutiny could only be used in cases of reverse discrimination,
and therefore only the rational relation test remained.17 1 In applying the rational relation test, Justice Hopkins stated that,
"the Legislature could legitimately find that school districts are
proper means by which the operation and financing of schools
within the State shall be accomplished.' 17 ' Furthermore, because the rational relation test was used by Justice Hopkins instead of the heightened scrutiny test, he opined that there was
no need to consider the availability of a less objectionable
73

alternative.1

In interpreting the education clause, Justice Hopkins ex74
amined the wording of the provision to derive its meaning.1
Justice Hopkins separated the provision into three elements:
"First, the constitutional duty is cast on the legislature; second,
that duty includes both maintenance and support of a system of
common schools; third, the system shall be free to all children of
the State.' 75 In focusing on the particular language of the education clause, Justice Hopkins explained that "[tlhe word 'support' clearly indicates financial backing," and that a "system is a
whole composed of parts in orderly arrangement according to

170. Id. at 264, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 872 (Hopkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
171. Id. See Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 336, 348 N.E.2d
537, 545, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82, 90 (1976) (intermediate level of review is appropriate in
resolving reverse discrimination claims).
Justice Hopkins noted in his opinion that, "the Court of Appeals has not demonstrated any disposition to enlarge the 'heightened scrutiny' test where educational legislation was the point of attack." Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 264, 443
N.Y.S.2d at 872 (Hopkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In support of
that statement, he pointed out that in Lombardi v. Nyquist, 63 A.D.2d 1058, 406
N.Y.S.2d 148 (3d Dep't 1978), the appellate division "held that the 'rationality' test
should be applied to article 89 of the Education Law, and leave to appeal was denied by
the Court of Appeals ....
" Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 264 n.5, 443
N.Y.S.2d at 872 n.5 (Hopkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation
omitted).
172. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 265, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 873 (Hopkins, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
173. Id. at 265-66, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 873 (Hopkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
174. See supra note 10 for the full text of the education clause.
175. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 267, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 873 (Hopkins, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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some scheme or plan; an organized scheme or plan of action; an
orderly or regular method of procedure. ' 176 In applying those
terms to the context of the provision, Justice Hopkins noted
that:
State aid [from 1795 to the adoption of the Education Clause in
the State Constitution in 1894] had been furnished to the school
districts through the common school fund and direct grants...,
so that the language of the education article must have been selected with full knowledge and approval that State support
was to
77
be continued by the Legislature according to a system.
Concluding that the legislature was given the duty to provide a
system for support for the common schools, Justice Hopkins
then examined the current status of support for the New York
State system.
Tracing the developments of various ways to provide support for the system of common schools, Justice Hopkins pointed
out various schemes adopted by the legislature to ensure satisfactory offerings of educational services among the districts.7 "
Such schemes included the "foundation grant" with accompanying "equalization grants" which were designed to yield a uniform
system.1" 9 In 1962, however, the foundation grant plan was re176. Id. (citing OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1971 ed.)). In a footnote, Justice Hopkins further explained the meaning of the word "system," stating:
More specialized definitions correspond. "A system is a group of components integrated to accomplish a purpose" (5 Encyclopedia of Education, The MacMillan
Co. and the Free Press, 1971, p 583). In the same digest it is remarked that an
educational system is composed of several subsidiary systems, such as the fundamental instructional system, and supportive systems, one of which is the financial
system, and that a supportive system should not impose unreasonable constraints
on the instructional system (id., pp 583-587).
Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 267 n.7, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 874 n.7 (Hopkins, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
177. Board of Ecud. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 267, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 874 (Hopkins, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
178. Id.
179. The foundation grant program was developed by George D. Strayer and Robert
M. Haig in 1923. The program was designed to equalize educational facilities and maintain a uniform burden of taxation throughout the state. The foundation grant program
required the state to guarantee a "foundation" dollar level of spending per pupil for each
district. Each district must then tax at a certain minimum property tax rate to qualify
for the program. Equalization grants by the state would then supplement the amounts
raised locally to the extent necessary for each district to meet the foundation level.
Under the program, individual districts could still raise additional revenues by taxing at
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placed by a "shared-cost" program, 80 which has been the subject of numerous amendments and "piecemeal modifications,"
and which, by 1974, "reach[ed] a level of complexity so as to
negate the existence of a basic State-wide fiscal system for education ... ,,
"I Noting that further modifications to the educational support system had been added by the legislature since
1974, Justice Hopkins concluded:
[W]hat needs to be stressed is that the 1974 complexities have
been converted into a veritable jungle of labyrinthine incongruity ....

What began as a simple exercise of arithmetical pro-

portions in the distribution of State Aid has been distended in
the last 30 years into a prodigious task. Moreover, the conception
of a system geared to the foundation grant, or aid based on the
fiscal needs of the school districts in terms of their respective
wealth, has disappeared under the enveloping layers of contingencies and obscurity introduced by the contradictory effect of the
flat grant and save-harmless provisions. The statutes now resemble a patchwork mounted on patchwork, an Ossa of confusion
piled on a Pelion of disorder. Thus, the design of a uniform and
harmonious system conceived by its nineteenth century authors
had been frustrated and distorted by the twentieth century attempts of legislators to satisfy the conflicting demands of their
constituents.s
Thus, Justice Hopkins found a violation of the education clause
of the New York Constitution.

more than the minimum rate. J. COONS, W. CLUNE III & S.

SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH

AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 63-64 (1970).

180. The "shared-cost" program allows each district to design its own educational
program. The cost of the program is then shared on an equalized basis between the district and the state. The shared-cost program was considered preferable to the foundation
grant program. Under the foundation grant program, the state only contributed to an
acceptable minimum educational program, whereas the shared-cost program provides
state aid for any educational program developed by the local school districts. Id. at 183
(quoting UNIVERSITY OF STATE OF NEW YORK, STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OF
EDUCATIONAL FINANCE RESEARCH, STUDIES OF PUBLIC SCHOOL SUPPORT 1966 SERIES: VITAL

ISSUES IN PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE 10 (1967)).
181. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 267-68, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 874 (Hopkins,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Mort, Unification of Fiscal Policy in
New York State, in C. BENSON, PERSPECTIVES ON THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 341
(1963) (emphasis in original)).
182. Id. at 269, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 875 (Hopkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part).
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The Court of Appeals
1. The majority decision"'3

The court of appeals, addressing the original plaintiffs' federal equal protection claim first, stated that the essence of their
claim was that the disparities in per pupil expenditure among
districts and the failure of the state to remedy such disparities
resulted in an "impermissible discrimination against pupils in
the less property-wealthy districts in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment . . ,.84 The court of appeals concluded, however,
that the original plaintiffs' claim was considered and rejected by
the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez. 85 Thus, the
court of appeals rejected the original plaintiffs' federal equal
protection claim, affirming the appellate division and the trial
court rulings, relying on Rodriguez.
Considering the plaintiffs-intervenors' federal equal protection claim next, the majority reiterated Justice Hopkins' observation that the "inequalities existing in cities are the product of
demographic, economic, and political factors intrinsic to the cities themselves, and cannot be attributed to legislative action or
inaction."' 8 6 Furthermore, with regard to metropolitan overburden,1 7 the majority quoted Justice Hopkins' opinion, stating:
It is beyond the power of this court in this litigation to determine
whether the appropriations of the intervenor-plaintiffs have been
wisely directed or reasonably applied, or whether their budgets
are fairly divided in terms of priority of need between the competing services, such as police, fire, health, housing and transportation, and it is, equally, beyond the power of the court to determine whether the resources of the intervenor-plaintiffs can
otherwise be employed so that their educational needs can be
met.'"
183. Judge Jones delivered the majority opinion of the court of appeals and was
joined by Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, Wachtler, and Meyer. Judge
Fuchsberg dissented in a separate opinion. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439
N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982).
184. Id. at 40, 439 N.E.2d at 364, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 649.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 41, 439 N.E.2d at 365, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 649.
187. See supra note 12.
188. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 42, 439 N.E.2d at 365, 453 N.Y.S.2d at
649-50 (quoting Justice Hopkins, Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 262, 443
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Thus, by applying the rational relation test, the court of appeals
concluded that there was no federal equal protection violation as
to the plaintiffs-intervenors. 5 9
In addressing the state equal protection claims, the majority
expressly stated that In re Levy' 90 requires that the rational relation test be used whenever "challenged state action implicate[s] the right to free, public education."' ' The majority reasoned that rational relation scrutiny is appropriate when the
discrimination is between units of local government (propertypoor and property-wealthy school districts).19 2 Thus, the court of
appeals concluded "that the justification offered by the State the preservation and promotion of local control of education to which the present
is both a legitimate State interest and one
193
related."
reasonably
is
system
financing
N.Y.S.2d at 871).
189. Id. at 42, 439 N.E.2d at 365, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 650.
190. 38 N.Y.2d 653, 345 N.E.2d 556, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S.
805 (1976). For a discussion of Levy, see supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
191. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 43, 439 N.E.2d at 365, 453 N.Y.S.2d at
650. The court of appeals rejected the intermediate (heightened scrutiny) level of review
by relying on Rodriguez and Levy. Id.
192. Id. at 44, 439 N.E.2d at 366, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651. The majority determined
that a classification of persons, not of governmental units, is necessary to invoke a higher
level of review. Id. In refusing to define education as a fundamental right, which would
have required the application of strict scrutiny, the court stated:
The inclusion in our State Constitution of a declaration of the Legislature's
obligation to maintain and support an educational system is not to be accorded
the same significance for purposes of equal protection analysis as would a counterpart reference to education in the Federal Constitution. The two documents are
drafted from discretely different constitutional perspectives. The Federal Constitution is one of delegated powers and specified authority; all powers not delegated
to the United States or prohibited to the States are reserved to the States or to
the people (US Const, 10th Amdt). Great significance accordingly is properly attached to rights guaranteed and interests protected by express provision of the
Federal Constitution. By contrast, because it is not required that our State Constitution contain a complete declaration of all powers and authority of the State,
the references which do appear touch on subjects and concerns with less attention
to any hierarchy of values, and the document concededly contains references to
matters which could as well have been left to statutory articulation (e.g., provision
for superintendence and repair of canals, art. XV, § 3, scarcely to be classified a
fundamental constitutional right on any view).
Id. at 43 n.5, 439 N.E.2d at 366 n.5, 453 N.Y.S.2d. at 650 n.5.
193. Id. at 44, 439 N.E.2d at 366, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651. In recognizing the legitimacy
of local control of education, the court of appeals noted that historically, "the people of
[New York] State have remained true to the concept that the maximum support of the
public schools and the most informed, intelligent and responsive decision-making as to
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With respect to the education clause, where a violation had
been found by the lower courts, the majority noted that the language of the constitutional provision did not specifically require
equal education among the districts.'" 4 According to the majority, "[wihat appears to have been contemplated when the education article was adopted at the 1894 Constitutional Convention
was a State-wide system assuring minimal acceptable facilities
and services in contrast to the unsystemized delivery of instruction then in existence within the State."' 9 The majority reasoned that the legislature assures minimal acceptable facilities
by providing a system which prescribes "the minimum number
of days of school attendance, required courses, textbooks, qualifications of teachers and of certain nonteaching personnel, pupil
transportation, and other matters."'196 In response to Justice
Hopkins' analysis regarding the system of financial support, 9 7
the majority stated that the word "system," as used in the education clause, modifies "free common schools" instead of "maintenance and support" and, therefore, "it is immaterial that the
Legislature in its wisdom has seen fit to provide financial sup98
port under complex formulas with a variety of components."'1
Thus, after noting that the average per pupil expenditure in
New York exceeds all other states except two, the majority was
satisfied that the constitutional requirement was met.'9 9
2.

Judge Fuchsberg's dissent

In finding the equal protection violations, Judge Fuchsberg,
the lone dissenter, concurred with the appellate division's determination that the intermediate level of scrutiny was approprithe financing and operation of those schools is legislated by giving citizens direct and
meaningful control over the schools that their children attend." Id. at 46, 439 N.E.2d at
367, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 652 (quoting amicus brief filed on behalf of the 85 school districts).
The court of appeals also determined that the differences in services and facilities
among the districts arise from the willingness of the taxpayers to finance an enriched
education. Id. at 45, 439 N.E.2d at 367, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
194. Id. at 47, 439 N.E.2d at 368, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
195. Id. at 47, 439 N.E.2d at 368, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
196. Id. at 48, 439 N.E.2d at 368-69, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
197. See supra notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
198. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 48 n.7, 439 N.E.2d at 368 n.7, 453
N.Y.S.2d at 653 n.7.
199. Id. at 48-49, 439 N.E.2d at 369, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
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ate.2 °0 Judge Fuchsberg relied substantially on the statistics admitted at trial that evidenced the gross disparities among the
school districts. 20 ' Consequently, Judge Fuchsberg concluded
that, "'the failure to provide State aid on an equitable basis deprived the children in the large city districts of an equal protection opportunity.' ",202 Judge Fuchsberg also noted that the burdens faced by the original plaintiffs were effectively identical to
those borne by the city school districts.0 3
Regarding the education clause, Judge Fuchsberg reiterated
Justice Hopkins' remark, "that 'the design of a uniform and harmonious system conceived by its nineteenth century authors had
been frustrated and distorted' into 'a veritable jungle of labyrinthine incongruity', 'an Ossa of confusion piled on a Pelion of dis-

order.'

"204

Therefore, Judge Fuchsberg determined that the

New York school financing scheme violated the state education
clause.20 5
V.
A.

Analysis

The Federal Equal Protection Claims

s6
The New York courts, in Board of Education v. Nyquist, 0
recognized the substantial similarity between the New York

200. Id. at 58, 439 N.E.2d at 374, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 659 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
Judge Fuchsberg suggested the use of strict scrutiny despite the mandate of Rodriguez.
He reasoned that the basis for strict scrutiny is discrimination with respect to race and
alienage, and because minorities are a disproportionate population of the city school districts, the inadequate aid to those districts discriminates against the state's minority students. Id. at 59-60, 439 N.E.2d at 375-76, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 659-60. See also Board of
Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 254-55, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 866-67 (Weinstein, J.,
concurring).
201. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 50, 439 N.E.2d at 370, 453 N.Y.S.2d at
654 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 55, 439 N.E.2d at 373, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 657 (quoting Justice Smith, Board
of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d at 519, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 634).
203. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 55, 439 N.E.2d at 373, 453 N.Y.S.2d at
657 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
204. Id. (quoting Justice Hopkins, Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 269, 443
N.Y.S.2d at 875) (emphasis added).
205. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 50, 439 N.E.2d at 370, 453 N.Y.S.2d at
654 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
206. 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1978), modified, 83
A.D.2d 217, 443 N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d Dep't 1981), modified, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359,
453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982), appeal dismissed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3532 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1983) (Nos.
82-639 and 82-655).
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school financing system and the Texas system which was considered by the United States Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. 0 7 The presence of the
plaintiffs-intervenors' federal equal protection claim, based on
metropolitan overburden, did not sufficiently distinguish Nyquist from Rodriguez. 08 Consequently, the doctrine of stare decisis justified the dismissal of the plaintiffs' federal equal protection claims. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court's approval
of this result can be inferred from its dismissal of the Nyquist
appeal. 09
B.

The State Equal Protection Claims

As stated by Justice Hopkins in his appellate division opinion, "the interpretation made by the Supreme Court of the
United States concerning the meaning and effect of the Fourteenth Amendment must be granted great respect by the State
courts when they are called on to construe the equal protection
clause of the State Constitution. 2 1 0 Support for this proposition
can be found in New York case law, which has held that New
York's equal protection clause is equal in breadth to its federal
counterpart.'
The plaintiffs in Nyquist failed to persuade Justice Hopkins, and later, the court of appeals, that a sufficient
justification existed for departing from this interpretation of
New York's equal protection clause.
Education was not deemed a fundamental interest by the
court of appeals, and accordingly the strict scrutiny test was not
applied to the equal protection challenges to the New York
school financing system.2 ' The United States Supreme Court in
Rodriguez had held that education was not a fundamental inter207. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
208. See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 41, 439 N.E.2d at 365, 453
N.Y.S.2d at 649.
209. See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 51 U.S.L.W. 3532 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1983) (Nos. 82639 and 82-655) (appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question).
210. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 258-59, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 869 (Hopkins,
J., concuring in part and dissenting in part).
211. See, e.g., Seaman v. Fedourich, 16 N.Y.2d 94, 209 N.E.2d 778, 262 N.Y.S.2d 444
(1965); Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
212. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 43-44, 439 N.E.2d at 366, 453 N.Y.S.2d
at 650-51.
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est, relying, however, on the absence of an explicit reference in
the United States Constitution to the right to education.2 13 The
New York State Constitution, unlike its federal counterpart, explicitly refers to education as a right inuring to the people of the
state.2 14 Since education is constitutionally mandated under the
state constitution, the New York courts were forced to go beyond the reasoning of Rodriguez to decide what that right
involved.
The court of appeals, in determining the extent of the right
to education under the state constitution, rejected the argument
that since education was explicitly referred to in the constitution, it was a fundamental state interest.2 15 In so holding, the
court noted that many powers were enumerated in the state constitution that did not encompass fundamental interests, such as
a provision for the superintendence and repair of canals,"1 6 and
therefore such matters were not to be given greater importance
merely because of their inclusion in the state constitution.21 7 To
reinforce this interpretation, Justice Hopkins' equal protection
analysis added additional concerns that could have resulted had
the court of appeals not properly rejected the elevation of education to a fundamental interest, requiring strict scrutiny. Justice
Hopkins noted that many powers and rights, including education, were explicitly included in the state constitution.21 8 If the
education clause was held to violate the state equal protection
clause due to the demonstrated fiscal disparities in this case, future cases would undoubtedly follow where other enumerated
rights, such as public health,2 1 9 would be challenged for containing fiscal disparities in the manner in which the funds were distributed among the state.2 2 0 The state could, if required under

213. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 10.
215. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 43-44, 439 N.E.2d at 366, 453 N.Y.S.2d
at 650.
216. See N.Y. CONST. art. XV, § 3.
217. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 43 n.5, 439 N.E.2d at 366 n.5, 453
N.Y.S.2d at 650 n.5. See supra note 192.
218. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 261, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 871 (Hopkins, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). See supra notes 162-67 and accompanying
text.
219. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 3.
220. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 261, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 871 (Hopkins, J.,
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this reasoning to provide only comprehensive, exactly tailored
services for such interests, choose to deny all services, as the
court of appeals warned in Levy, thus providing equal treatment
to all people of the state under the "categorically neat policy
that since all could not be benefitted, none would be."' Rather
than compel the legislature and the courts to hammer out precise, exact solutions in a complex and imprecise world, the court
of appeals correctly opted for the present system of school
financing, satisfied that it provided at least a basic education for
all children of the state, which exceeded the quality offered by
most other states.2
State funding of public education in New York has been
provided by statute since 1795, over 100 years before the education clause was added to the state constitution.2 3 With this in
mind, Justice Hopkins, in his appellate division opinion, examined the history of public education funding in New York in
assessing the state equal protection claims. The delegation of the
financing of public schools to the local municipalities by the
state was, according to Justice Hopkins, "part of the fundamental pattern of our government."22 4 Despite acknowledging that
the resources of the local municipalities vastly differed, Justice
Hopkins explained that an equal protection claim based on such
delegation of duties had to fail unless one was willing to hold
that the state could not constitutionally delegate any functions
that created some inequality due to the local control. 2 5 According to the court of appeals, the inequities that were demonstrated were the result of demographic, economic, and political
factors, rather than any state action.2 2' Thus, without a direct
showing of purposeful discrimination by the state creating these
inequities, the courts had to defer to the legislature to remedy

concurring in part and dissenting in part).
221. In re Levy, 38 N.Y.2d 653, 660, 345 N.E.2d 556, 560, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13, 17, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 805 (1976). See supra note 111.
222. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 48-49, 439 N.E.2d at 369, 453 N.Y.S.2d
at 653. See supra text accompanying note 199.
223. See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 261, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 870 (Hopkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 260-61, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 870.
226. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 41, 439 N.E.2d at 365, 453 N.Y.S.2d at
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the present inequities found in the New York State educational
financing system. Given the structure of the state government,
the history of local control, and the regional interests of the residents of the state, this approach was the strongest justification
for denying the state equal protection claims.
In cases challenging state financing of public schools such as
Rodriguez and Nyquist, the plaintiffs have always asserted that
unequal wealth among the school districts resulted in disparities
in the quality of education among the local school districts.2 2
Although the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs-intervenors in Nyquist
were able to show disparities in wealth among various local
school districts in New York State, no conclusive showing of unequal educational services was ever established.2 2 Justice Hopkins, in his appellate division opinion, squarely addressed the
claims of varying degrees of state supplied education among the
districts. He first attacked the notion that expenditures alone
were decisive of the quality of education. Noting that commentators were critical of the lack of proof of this correlation, he
refused to strike down the present system on such unproven theories. 22 In addressing the claim that wealthier districts could afford more expansive buildings and maintain larger staffs, thus
reducing the teacher-pupil ratio, Justice Hopkins suggested that
these factors, in and of themselves, did not insure a higher quality of education over the poorer districts. Drawing perhaps on his
own educational background and interests, he suggested that a
one-room school house, with a capable teacher and attentive
pupils, might yield a better education than a large suburban
school with small class sizes, or alternatively, that cultural and
artistic resources available in New York City such as museums
might provide experiences that students outside of New York

227. See, e.g., id. at 35-36, 439 N.E.2d at 361-62, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 646; accord Brief
for Appellees at 3, San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973),
reprinted in 76 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 173, 175 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 1975).
228. See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 259-60, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 869-70
(Hopkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
229. Id. at 259, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 870 (citing J. COONS, W. CLUNE III & S. SUGARMAN,
PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 30 (1970); Note, A Statistical Analysis of the
School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303
(1972)).
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City could not enjoy.2 3 0 Despite all of the impressive figures on
the disparities in wealth among the local school districts, Justice
Hopkins' analysis places these statistics in their proper perspective, and accordingly, without further proof of their correlation
to educational opportunities, the equal protection arguments
were properly denied.
C.

The Education Clause Claims

The court of appeals, although agreeing with Justice Hopkins' appellate division opinion in finding no violation of the
federal or state equal protection clauses, rejected Justice Hopkins' finding that there was a violation of the education
clause."' 1 Both the majority and Justice Hopkins examined the
wording of the education clause to come to their respective results. According to Justice Hopkins, the word "system" encompasses more than just the fundamental instructional system, and
includes the maintenance and support of that system.23 In tracing the historical context of the education clause, he found further justification for his interpretation, in that state funding had
been supplied to the public schools through a common school
fund for 100 years before the education clause was included in
the state constitution, inferring that the education clause was
selected with the approval that state support was to be continued through a system. 3 Concluding that the education clause
required a system of maintenance and support, Justice Hopkins
found no such system to exist given the complex and patchwork
formulas for computing and assessing state aid to local school
districts currently in use.2 34 The court of appeals, in interpreting
the education clause, consulted the relevant legislative history of
the provision.2 35 Although it indicated that such history was "in-

230. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 260 n.2, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 870 n.2. See
supra note 161. Justice Hopkins' grade school education was in a one-room schoolhouse
in Armonk. See A Tribute to Justice James D. Hopkins, supra at 442, 448, 453.
231. See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 48 n.7, 439 N.E.2d at 368 n.7, 453
N.Y.S.2d at 653 n.7.
232. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 266-67, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 873-74 (Hopkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
233. Id. at 267, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
234. Id. at 269, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 875. See supra text accompanying note 182.
235. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 47-48 & n.6, 439 N.E.2d at 368 & n.6,
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formative," the majority deemed it irrelevant to an interpretation of the provision, stating that what had been suggested as
"sound educational policy" in interpreting the system to include
maintenance and support had to be "clearly distinguished from
the command laid on the Legislature by the Constitution. ' 23 6
Thus, the court of appeals, based on what the legislative history
did not explicitly state, rejected Justice Hopkins' analysis of a
system, stating that "system" merely modified "free common
schools. ' 23 7 Under this interpretation, the court of appeals required that a "system of free common schools" include only a
"sound basic education."2 "
When conflicting interpretations by various courts arise in
cases such as this one, both interpretations are usually plausible
and have support in the law. In the instant case, concededly
both interpretations are faithful to the legislative history and
the law. The court of appeals rejected Justice Hopkins' interpretation, upholding the financing system as constitutional upon
the justification that New York State was "a leader in free public education" and that its "per pupil expenditure exceed[ed]
that in all other States but two."'3 9 In so concluding, the court
of appeals implicitly adopted the argument that per pupil expenditure was directly correlated to educational quality, a notion never proven and openly criticized by Justice Hopkins. 40
Without further explanation of the relationship of district expenditure and educational quality, the court of appeals adopted
a pragmatic approach, refusing to strike the financing system
despite the acknowledged amalgam of the current system.
Although the majority was careful to indicate "the very
great, and perhaps understandable, temptation to yield a resultoriented resolution of this litigation" as it so chastised the dissent,'" ' it was not completely immune from this evil itself. Without a comprehensive plan to replace the current system, it can

453 N.Y.S.2d at 652-53 & n.6.
236. Id. at 48 n.6, 439 N.E.2d at 368 n.6, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 653 n.6.
237. Id. at 48 n.7, 439 N.E.2d at 368 n.7, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 653 n.7.
238. Id. at 47-48, 439 N.E.2d at 368-69, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 652-53.
239. Id. at 48, 439 N.E.2d at 369, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 229-30.
241. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 49 n.9, 439 N.E.2d at 369 n.9, 453
N.Y.S.2d at 654 n.9.
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be inferred that the court of appeals was loathe to reject a
flawed, but working, system in favor of leaving the issue to the
legislature to resolve. Given the political interests involved, pitting small districts against large, poor against wealthy, rural
against urban, town against city, the legislature would be hard
pressed to produce a solution better than that which currently
exists. This approach, however, validates and perpetuates the
legislature's failure to improve the educational system. The
court of appeals' decision is not a resounding vote in favor of
New York's current financing system; there is much need for the
legislature to devise a better solution to this important state
function.
VI.

Conclusion

The New York Court of Appeals decision in Board of Education v. Nyquist represents a pragmatic conclusion to a controversial issue. The court correctly applied the rational relation
test in determining the validity of the equal protection challenge
to New York's public school financing system. Additionally, New
York's education clause is not a basis for finding a fundamental
right to education. Indeed, had the equal protection claims been
sustained, a floodgate of litigation challenging the financial support of other constitutional mandates may have opened. Finally,
this case presents issues which are particularly suited for resolution in the legislature without judicial intervention.
Fred R. Green
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